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MEDICAL FUTILITY
Robert D. Truog*
CASE: SUN HUDSON
Wanda Hudson gave birth to a boy, whom she named Sun, on
September 25, 2004, at St. Luke's Hospital in Houston, Texas. She
had received no prenatal care before giving birth, so she was unaware
that her baby would be born with significant physical and mental
disabilities. When Sun was born, he had dwarf-like features, with
very short appendages and an enlarged head, and he experienced
significant respiratory distress from the moment he was delivered. He
was immediately transferred and admitted to Texas Children's
Hospital's Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), the largest
in the nation. He was placed on a ventilator and a feeding tube was
inserted.
Genetic tests showed that Sun was born with thanatophoric
dysplasia, which is a rare, fatal condition. While this lethal form of
dwarfism causes severe mental and physical disabilities, what
ultimately contributes to death is an abnormally narrow chest cavity
that restricts the baby's ability to breathe. The chest cavity does not
grow normally, so the baby's breathing problems only worsen until
the baby suffocates to death. Most babies affected with this disorder
die within a few hours or days after birth of respiratory insufficiency.
Ms. Hudson claimed that the sun was the boy's father and that he
was normal and just needed time to develop. She insisted that
intensive care continue to be provided to Sun. Physicians and other
hospital personnel thought that she was incompetent to make
decisions for Sun's care and that further care was futile and medically
inappropriate and should be withdrawn. The Children's Bioethics
Committee agreed. This was the first case to arise under the Texas
Advance Directives Act, and the hospital provided Ms. Hudson with
* Professor of Medical Ethics, Anaesthesiology and Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, and
Senior Associate in Critical Care Medicine, Children's Hospital Boston.
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 985 2008-2009
  
 * 
 
    
 '  
 r i   t l     
t t r  l    it  i i i t l  
i iliti .    ,  
 t   
i ifi t i t  i t      
as i ediately transferred and a itte  t  e as il r 's 
s it l's l III t l i t i    , t 
   
 
   t ric 
s l si , i  i   r r , t l iti . il   nn f 
rfis    t l   t 
lti t l  tri t  t  t  i   nn ll   
t t r stri ts t  's ilit  t  r t .  t it    
r  nn ll ,  t  '  t i  l s   
t   s ff t s t  t . t i  t  it   r 
i  it i   f  r    t  i t   i . 
s. s  l i  t t t    t  '      
s r l  j t  ti   .   
i t si  r  ti  t   r i  t  . i i  r 
s ital rs l t t t t   i t t   
isi s f r 's r   t t f rt r   til   ll  
i a r riate  s l   it r .  il 's i  
itt  . i     i  r   
a ce ir ti s t,  t  it l i  .   
• Professor of Medical Ethics, Anaesthesiology and Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School, and 
enior ss ciate i  ritical are i i e, il ren's it l t . 
985 
1
Truog: Medical Futility
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
independent legal counsel as the case was filed in court. On March
14, 2005, nearly six months after Sun's birth, the probate judge
hearing the case found there was no alternative provider willing to
continue care for Sun and lifted the court's injunction and allowed
the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from Sun. Ms.
Hudson came to the hospital the following day and was holding Sun
when he died shortly after treatment was withdrawn.'
Cases like that of Sun Hudson's are among the most frustrating
encountered by physicians and nurses in medicine today. As
technology has become increasingly effective at prolonging life, the
dark side of this success has emerged in the demands of families to
use this technology to sustain life in situations that at best offer no
hope of meaningful existence, and that at worst subject patients to
unconscionable pain and suffering. As one of the most important
functions of the law is to ensure due process, the temptation in this
essay is to elaborate upon the strengths and weaknesses of the various
procedural approaches that have been developed in attempts to
resolve these disputes.
Although I will return to this issue at the end of the manuscript, I
will begin by taking a step back from the usual discourse that
surrounds this topic and provide what might be called a "differential
diagnosis" of the concept of futility. In medical parlance, a
differential diagnosis is a list of the possible conditions that could be
causing the patient's signs and symptoms. In this context, it pertains
to those sociological, psychological, and financial issues that often
play a determinative role in how these conflicts are framed and
resolved. My differential diagnosis is built around the issues of
power, trust, hope, money, and suffering.
2
1. Lance Lightfoot, Incompetent Decision Makers and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: A
Case Study, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHics 851, 851-52 (2005).
2. John D. Lantos, Futility Assessments and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS
Soc'Y 868, 868-70 (1994).
[Vol 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 986 2008-2009
986   I E SITY   ( L :  
t  
   
  r   
   
   
   
 s rtl  after treat ent was withdrawn. I 
   
    
      
     
   
f l ,  
l    t t 
        ,     
     
r l s    
 
    
  
    ti l 
i   t  l  
 i    
'     
, ,  
 i ti e  
 l  
, , oney, and suffering.2 
I. e t, t t i   ra al i  t:  
   ICS ,   
.  . t , tilit  t   t  t r- atient l ti i ,  . . l l  
OC'y ,  94). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 13
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/13
MEDICAL FUTILITY
I. POWER
The first element in the differential diagnosis is power. While
many scholars have attempted to define medical futility, my favorite
description comes from the cartoonist Gahan Wilson in the New
Yorker Magazine, who penned a scene of a browbeaten physician
kneeling before a tombstone in a cemetery, anxiously fiddling with
his stethoscope over the grave. Standing behind and over him with an
intimidating expression is someone we take to be the wife of the
deceased, seemingly demanding that the physician perform a miracle.
All the physician can do is submissively look back over his shoulder
and apologetically explain, "I'm afraid there is really very little I can
do .... 
3
This cartoon successfully captures the essence of the futility debate
as it is experienced by clinicians. Fundamentally, the debate over
medical futility can be summed up in the questions: "Who has the
power to demand treatment, and who has the power to say no?" In
this sense, these questions have taken a 180-degree turn over the last
few decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, the debate was about the
rights of patients to refuse medical treatment. Whereas today we
recognize broad rights for patients to refuse unwanted therapy, during
the past two decades the central question has shifted to the rights of
patients and families to demand medical treatment, and here we have
little, if any, consensus.
As bioethicist John Lantos has observed, how one views the debate
hinges to a large extent on how one frames the issues. So, for
example, those who ask, "Do patients and families have a right to
force doctors to squander scarce time and resources on therapies that
have no benefit in order to satisfy their irrational wishes?" will likely
come to different conclusions from those who ask, "Do doctors have
a right to arbitrarily ignore the values and preferences of patients and
3. Gahan Wilson, I'm Afraid There Is Really Very Little I Can Do, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 15,
1999, http://www.thenewyorkerstore.com/product-details.asp?sid=40848.
20091
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families using their own value systems to make life and death
decisions for others? ' 4
Bioethicist Art Caplan has helpfully characterized this as a debate
about "odds and ends," with conflicts about futility being defined by
how one answers the questions: "What chance or probability of
success is 'worth it'?" (a question of odds) and, "What quality of
outcome is 'worth it'?"(a question of ends). 5 Throughout the years
there have been many attempts to define futility in terms of medical
criteria, thereby placing it squarely within the medical domain and
implicitly empowering physicians with the authority to decide what is
futile and what is not. Yet despite the wish to fence these judgments
within the realm of medical expertise, even casual reflection reveals
that physicians did not learn in medical school the answers to
questions such as: "Is a one in a thousand chance of success 'worth
it'?" or, "Is a life with moderately severe cognitive disabilities 'worth
it'?" As I will discuss in more detail below, although the Texas
Advance Directives Act (TADA) does not explicitly endorse the
decision-making power of physicians over patients, it has stacked the
deck in such a way so as to give them virtually absolute authority.
II. TRUST
The second element in the differential diagnosis is trust. Articles
about futility rarely explore the fact that these conflicts do not arise
randomly. Although there are some notable exceptions, futility cases
most commonly involve patients and families from the more
marginalized and disadvantaged segments of our society. These are
families who have lived on the outskirts of our healthcare system, and
who have frequently been denied or perceive that they have been
denied, care that is beneficial. Now they are, once again, being told
that they cannot have a treatment that may not only be beneficial but
actually life-sustaining. Why should they believe physicians who tell
4. Id. at 868.
5. Arthur L. Caplan, Odds and Ends: Trust and the Debate over Medical Futility, 125 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 688 (1996).
[Vol. 25:4
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them that the use of this treatment would be futile? In point of fact,
research actually shows that their skepticism may be justified.
Numerous studies demonstrate that "evidence-based" predictors of
mortality are highly unreliable for individual patients.
6
III. HOPE
Third on the list is hope. Hope is not constrained by rationality. No
one thinks that someone is crazy just because they are hoping for
something that is very unlikely. One of the most important sources of
revenue in many states is the lottery, and its success is of course a
reflection of the very large number of people who buy tickets. Given
that lotteries have been accurately described as a tax on those who are
not very good at math, how should one account for their considerable
success? The answer, I think, is that when the payoff is big enough,
many people are willing to take unreasonable and irrational risks.
This is just human nature. For those who are desperately ill in the
hospital, where death may be the only alternative, is any chance of
success too small to hope for?
As the poet Maya Angelou said, "In order to survive, a human
being needs to live in a place furnished with hope." 7 Many
compassionate clinicians have learned that patients and families can
evolve through terminal illness to see their hopes transformed from a
wish for cure and recovery to hopes for peace and closure. But it does
not always work this way. Abigail Zuger wrote of her experience as a
resident in internal medicine caring for Jerry, a patient with terminal
AIDS.8 Day after day, she went into his room trying to persuade him
to accept a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, explaining that any
6. See Sonia Frick, Dominik E. Uehlinger & Regula M. Zuercher Zenklusen, Medical Futility:
Predicting Outcome of Intensive Care Unit Patients by Nurses and Doctors-A Prospective
Comparative Study, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. 456, 456-61 (2003); see also Pedro A. Mendez-Tellez &
Todd Dorman, Predicting Patient Outcomes, Futility, and Resource Utilization in the Intensive Care
Unit: The Role of Severity Scoring Systems and General Outcome Prediction Models, 80 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 161, 161-63 (2005); John Rapoport, Daniel Teres & Stanley Lemeshow, Can Futility Be Defined
Numerically? 26 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1781, 1781 (1998).
7. Interview by Oprah Winfrey with Maya Angelou in Chicago, Ii. (2003).
8. Abigail Zuger, High Hopes, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2988 (1989).
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attempts at resuscitation were bound to be futile, leading only to pain
and suffering that would end in death. Each day he resisted, feeling
confident that a cure was "just around the comer" and could happen
any day. But eventually he got the picture, reason prevailed, and he
signed his DNR order. But she closes her essay with a moving and
ambivalent observation on the "success" of her counseling to have
Jerry forego intensive care and resuscitation: "Which was, in fact, the
greater cruelty? Was it the one she avoided, which would have
condemned Jerry to a protracted death in the intensive care unit, all
blood and tubes and pain? Or was it the one she committed, sitting on
Jerry's bed, holding his hand, and methodically erasing all the hope
from his eager eyes?" Reason and rationality have their place, but
they also have their price.
IV. MONEY
One of the most complex and confusing elements of the
differential diagnosis is the role of money, and in particular the way
that judgments about futility have been conflated with judgments
about the fair allocation of scarce resources, or rationing. The work
of Larry Schneiderman and his colleagues has been very clear on this
point: "rationing refers to the allocation of beneficial treatments
among patients; [whereas] futility refers to whether a treatment will
benefit an individual patient."9 In other words, denying futile care to
patients and families should have nothing to do with saving money
through the fair allocation of scarce resources. If a treatment is futile,
it is not worth doing, no matter how much it costs, no matter how
little it costs-indeed, futile treatments are not worth doing even if
they are free.
While this point is well-accepted within the academic community
and the literature on this topic, the truth is that actual futility cases are
almost always intertwined with questions about saving money and
9. Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jeeker, Medical Futility: Response to Critiques, 125
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 670, 673 (1996).
[Vol. 25:4
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cutting costs. Consider, for example, that questions of futility rarely
arise around treatments that are cheap or easy to provide. For
example, if a patient with widely metastatic breast cancer demands to
be provided with vitamin C in the belief that it will be beneficial, I
suspect that few would object. After all, it costs almost nothing and is
safe-who cares if it does not work, as long as it makes the patient
feel good? On the other hand, if this same woman demands treatment
with high-dose chemotherapy followed by a bone marrow transplant
based on the same belief that it may be beneficial, most would refuse,
on grounds that convincing research has demonstrated that such
treatment offers no benefit and is futile. So even if one were to agree
that futility judgments should be isolated from financial
considerations, in the real world these judgments tend to be applied
primarily in situations that are resource-intensive.
The reasons for this provide some insight into the psychology of
futility determinations. As demonstrated by our recent healthcare
debates, most Americans are allergic to the concept of rationing in
healthcare. Yet everyone seems to understand that healthcare
expenditures are rising at an unsustainable rate. One strategy for
seeking to save money while refusing to acknowledge the need to
ration is to claim that all will be well if we simply stop providing
treatments that are futile. In this way, the concept of futility serves as
an end-around approach to rationing and saving money. In other
words, if we can label some treatments as futile, we can successfully
deny marginally beneficial treatments to patients and families without
having to acknowledge that we are really rationing.
This strategy has two significant problems. In the broadest sense,
fair allocation of resources requires us to separate those treatments
that are cost-effective from those that are not (within any defined
global budget for healthcare). But any fair approach to separating
cost-effective from non-cost-effective treatments must be willing to
look across the entire spectrum of all healthcare expenditures.
20091
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Consider, for example, the case of Avastin. 10 Initially approved for
treatment of advanced colon cancer, this drug can cost as much as
$100,000 per year, and in 2007 Genentech reported $2.3 billion in
sales in the United States alone-all of this for a drug that prolongs
life for patients with colon cancer by only a few months, at best
(recent studies suggest that its true effect may be even less).
Furthermore, Avastin was approved by the FDA this past February
for patients with metastatic breast cancer, against the
recommendation of its own advisory panel, and despite no evidence
of prolonged survival or improved quality of life in patients who
receive the drug.11
Now if Avastin were a unique example of an arguably non-cost-
effective treatment which is routinely made available to patients, both
on- and off-label, then the problem might be limited, but in fact the
Avastin example is not at all unusual, and indeed much of the new
drug development that is occurring in this country shares many of the
same problems.
So the issue is as follows: if one were to look at the definitions of
medical futility that have been developed over the years, Avastin
would surely seem to fit into that category, particularly for breast
cancer. If the goal is to provide only cost-effective care, then why are
policymakers not turning a critical eye on the many treatments that
are like Avastin? Could it be because elimination of these drugs
would significantly impact the profit margins of the pharmaceutical
companies and deny treatments (that offer more hope than benefit) to
the relatively few fortunate patients who are able to pay for them?
Why do we single out for elimination cases like that of Sun Hudson,
seeking to deny life-sustaining treatment under conditions that are
highly contentious, divisive, and fraught with difficulties in terms of
jeopardizing trust within the patient-physician relationship?
10. See Dan W. Brock, How Much Is More Life Worth? 36 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 17-19
(2006); see also Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, Costly Cancer Drug Offers Hope, but Also a Dilemma,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at Al.
11. See Kolata & Pollack, supra note 10.
[Vol. 25:4
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Not only is it unfair to target cases like that of Sun Hudson rather
than Avastin, but it is also ineffective. Evidence shows that refusing
to provide life-sustaining treatments under conditions of futility will
not save very much money. This point is counterintuitive to most
clinicians, because everyone who has practiced in hospitals can
remember horrendous cases, like that of Sun Hudson, that seem like
an enormous waste of money and resources. Yet there is a powerful
recall bias that is operative here; these cases seem to stick in our
memories for reasons that are out of proportion to their true impact.
Several lines of research all point to the conclusion that elimination
of treatments that meet any reasonable definition of futility will not
save very much money. Consider, for example, the Study to
Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of
Treatments (SUPPORT), a study of more than 4,000 critically ill
patients. 12 Of these patients, 115 were predicted to have less than a
1% chance of surviving two months. Of these, all but one died within
6 months, and most died within 5 days. If the clinicians had decided
that further treatment for these 115 patients was futile, and if they had
stopped treatment immediately, $1.2 million would have been saved.
Not only is this a relatively small amount of money in the context of
115 patients, but the majority of the money would have been saved in
the context of only 12 patients, 6 of whom were under 51 years of
age, one of whom lived for 10 months, and all of whom had religious
convictions not to have life support withdrawn. In other words, $1.2
million could have been saved, but almost certainly at the price of
considerable conflict, emotional angst, and potentially costly
litigation.
Other research using different methodologies has arrived at similar
conclusions. For example, a research group in Houston, Texas that
performed a retrospective review of patients in their adult intensive
care unit and examined the likely financial impact of refusing care
12. Joan M. Teno et al., Prognosis-Based Futility Guidelines: Does Anyone Win? 42 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC'Y. 1202, 1202-07 (1994).
20091
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they determined to be futile.' 3 They concluded that "[t]he frequency
of futile interventions appears to be low unless one is willing to
accept a definition that includes patients who could survive for many
months. . . .[T]his suggests the concept of futility will not play a
major role in cost-containment." A similar study in a Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) reached essentially the same conclusion:
"Despite our use of broad definitions of medical futility, relatively
small amounts of resources were used in futile PICU care ...
Attempts to reduce resource consumption in the PICU by focusing on
medical futility are unlikely to be successful."' 4 Willie Sutton
astutely robbed banks "because that's where the money is"15---one
could ask why those who seek to save healthcare dollars seem to
perseverate around highly contentious disputes involving the use of
life-sustaining therapies rather than focusing more productively on
the widespread use of extremely expensive, low-benefit treatments
like Avastin?
In sum, the debate about medical futility has been confused by
those who want to use the concept as a "back-door" way of rationing
resources, by denying marginally beneficial care to some patients
without having to acknowledge that it has anything to do with
rationing. This is wrongheaded first because it targets a generally
marginalized population rather than spreading the burdens fairly
across everyone in society, and second, because it addresses a
problem where the cost savings would be modest while ignoring the
need to ration or eliminate treatments that are equally ineffective and
where the cost savings would be quite substantial.16
13. Amir Halevy, Ryan C. Neal, Baruch A. Brody, The Low Frequency of Futility in an Adult
Intensive Care Unit Setting, 156 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 100-04 (1996).
14. Ramesh C. Sachdeva, Larry S. Jefferson, Jorge Coss-Bu, & Baruch A. Brody, Resource
Consumption and the Extent of Futile Care Among Patients in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit Setting,
128 J. PEDIATRICS 742, 742 (1996).
15. Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber, THE QUOTE, and the Final Irony,
http://www.banking.com/aba/ profile_0397.htm.
16. Martin L. Smith et al., Texas Hospitals' Experience with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 35
CRITIcAL CARE MED. 1271 (2007).
[VoL 25:4
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V. SUFFERING
The fifth and last element in the differential diagnosis for futility is
that of suffering. Suffering is an issue for everyone involved-
patients, families, and providers. My first point is that I do not think
we have been serious enough about preventing the suffering of
patients. When family members insist upon treatments that are
causing pain or suffering, we need to be much more proactive in
challenging their role as surrogate decision makers, and we need to
seek to have them replaced by a guardian ad litem, if necessary. In
comments before the President's Council on Bioethics in September
2008, legal scholar Thaddeus Pope noted that the courts recently have
been more willing to take this approach than they have been in the
past, particularly in situations where the surrogate does not seem
capable of fully appreciating and responding to the medical needs of
the patient.17
Judgments about suffering are subjective and do have some
pitfalls, however. For example, when children are admitted to the
intensive care unit in which I work, parents often ask if their child
will suffer. We are quick to reassure them, telling them that we take
great pride in using sedatives, analgesics, and other techniques to
assure that suffering is minimized or eliminated for the patients under
our care. However, days or weeks later, when the child has not
improved as we had hoped, we will often sit with the same parents
and recommend withdrawal of life support, sometimes supporting
this recommendation with the statement, "Your child has already
suffered so much." To be clear, I think this is perfectly
understandable, and I am not criticizing the practice per se (I have
said things like this on many occasions), but the point I want to make
here is that in the context of futility we cannot ask the word
"suffering" to mean whatever we want it to mean in order to suit our
purposes at the moment. The truth is, many times the patients
17. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Remarks Before the President's Council on Bioethics, Medical Futility:
Institutional and Legislative Initiatives (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/
sept08/session5.html.
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involved in futility disputes are either so severely neurologically
damaged or so deeply sedated that the possibility of pain and
suffering is remote. Under these circumstances, suffering is not an
issue.
The concerns about the suffering of caregivers are very different
but no less important. I will not explore them in detail in this essay,
but only note that issues of moral distress and burnout are of
increasing concern among intensive care unit (ICU) clinicians, and
especially among nurses. Three brief quotations from a paper that
deals with the problem of burnout among ICU nurses around
providing futile care give a flavor of the magnitude of the problem: 18
• "I often equate my job with 'keeping dead people alive.' On
these days, I dread coming to work."
• "I'm scared that I'm causing undue pain and suffering, and
this causes me great distress."
• "Some days I feel (physically) sick."
VI. RESOLVING FUTILITY DISPUTES
From all that has been written above, one might conclude that I
oppose futility policies and futility judgments, and indeed that is how
my views have often been characterized. But although I have many
concerns about the way that futility determinations are made, I do
recognize that unilateral judgments by physicians to deny treatments
that are inappropriate are ubiquitous in medicine. For example, one of
the technologies we have in the ICU is a form of cardiopulmonary
bypass called ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation). With
ECMO physicians can, quite literally, keep almost anyone alive. And
yet intensivists are highly selective in its use, reserving this expensive
and invasive therapy only for situations where we expect a patient's
cardiac or respiratory failure to be quickly reversible. When this is
18. Ellen H. Elpern, Barbara Covert, & Ruth Kleinpell, Moral Distress of Staff Nurses in a Medical
Intensive Care Unit, 14 AM. J. CRMCAL CARE 523, 525-27 (2005).
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not the case, I do not believe I have an obligation to offer ECMO to
patients and families or even an obligation to discuss it with them,
and I would refuse inappropriate demands from family members to
place a patient on ECMO.
What is the difference between the use of ECMO for patients with
irreversible cardiorespiratory failure and the use of mechanical
ventilation for patients like Sun Hudson? I will not pretend that there
is a clear and bright line here, and in both cases I think a good
argument can be made for unilateral refusal to provide life support.
The difference, I suggest, is in the nature of the process that must be
followed before such refusal is recognized as ethically and legally
legitimate. Though value judgments are present in both situations,
they are much more narrow and constrained in the ECMO case than
in the case of Sun Hudson. Life on ECMO is essentially life under
general anesthesia-when treatments are truly a "bridge to nowhere"
it is hard to imagine any worldview or set of values that could justify
a demand for this therapy. While some might see Sun Hudson's life
in the same terms, the fact is that many would judge life on a
ventilator, even if of poor quality and short duration, as valued and
worth living. In my mind, this puts decisions about life-support in
cases like that of Sun Hudson's in a different category from those
about the use of ECMO for irreversible cardiorespiratory failure.
The process for adjudicating these disputes is therefore central to
evaluating the legitimacy of how they are resolved. In the late 1990s,
the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association (AMA) endorsed a procedural approach to futility
determinations, stating that judgments of futility cannot be made by
reference to rules or definitions but must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 19 In this, it echoed an insight from U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart in his comments on pornography, when he
wrote, "I shall not today attempt further to define... [pornography];
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I
19. Charles W. Plows et al., Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 937, 939
(1999).
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know it when I see it." 20 In other words, futility and pornography are
both "all things considered" types of judgments that cannot be
adequately captured by rules or definitions. Instead, one must
develop a fair process for evaluating these conditions and then make
determinations on a case-by-case basis.
VII. FUTILITY POLICIES: CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
BOSTON VERSUS THE TEXAS ADVANCE DIRECTIVES ACT
Finally, then, I turn to two procedural approaches for determining
futility and compare their strengths and weaknesses. The first is the
futility policy at Children's Hospital Boston, which I helped develop
more than ten years ago,2 1 and the second is the Texas Advanced
Directives Act (TADA), which has been in place since 1999.22 Both
approaches essentially conform with the process that was
recommended by the AMA, in that both require consultation from an
ethics committee or medical review committee as well as attempts to
resolve the conflict by transfer of the patient to other willing
providers. Finally, both endorse cessation of the futile intervention if
the conflict remains intractable and if all opportunities for resolution
have been exhausted.
Under either approach, the process could reach a point when
clinicians inform the family that their demands for life-sustaining
treatment will no longer be honored. If the treatment is mechanical
ventilation, then the decision could be quite decisive and dramatic, as
in the clinicians' stating, "On Friday afternoon at three o'clock we
will withdraw the ventilator, and we anticipate that your relative will
die within minutes."
The two policies differ substantially, however, about the options
available to the family after the judgment of futility is made. At
20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
21. Jeffrey P. Bums & Robert D. Truog, Futility: A Concept in Evolution, 312 CHEST 1987, 1987-93
(2007).
22. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.001-166.166 (Vernon 2000); Robert
L. Fine, The Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999: Politics and Reality, 13 HEC FORuM 59, 59-81
(2001).
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Children's Hospital Boston, the family would be told that if they
disagreed with the decision, they would have the option of seeking a
court order to prohibit the physicians from withdrawing treatment.
Furthermore, if the family wanted to seek legal involvement but
could not afford the cost of legal representation, the hospital would
offer to cover those costs.
Has the policy at Children's Hospital Boston been effective in
resolving futility disputes? While we do not keep precise records, the
policy has been invoked on several occasions. Nevertheless, all of
these cases have been resolved without having to resort to unilateral
decision-making. Some view this as a failure of the policy, but I
would disagree. Before we had the policy, clinicians were very
reluctant to bring futility cases before the ethics committee because
they knew that the committee had no mechanism for overriding the
demands of parents. Now that we have a mechanism-a policy
requiring consultation with the committee and respect for the parents'
alternatives, including their option to pursue legal injunction-these
cases are brought to the committee and undergo intensive efforts to
achieve resolution. In some cases, the clinicians conclude that the
harms of unilaterally refusing treatment are greater than the benefits
of doing so. In other cases, the parents welcome the judgment of the
committee as taking the burden of decision-making off of their
shoulders, as if they were saying, "We could not have made this
decision on our own, but since the doctors and nurses feel so strongly
that this is the right thing to do, we will accept this judgment and not
continue to resist their recommendations." Although we have not yet
had a case that failed to reach resolution, if in the future such a case
does arise, there is no reason to believe that the clinicians and the
hospital administration would not follow through with a unilateral
decision to withdraw life support, in accord with our policy.
In contrast, under the TADA, the families' options are much more
limited. Under the Texas law, the physician's refusal to treat must
first be reviewed by the hospital's ethics or medical review
committee. The family must be given forty-eight hours' notice and be
invited to participate in the process. The hospital must make
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reasonable efforts to transfer the patient's care to others (which is
usually not possible, because other institutions are very reluctant to
take on cases already engulfed in anger and conflict). If no provider
can be found in ten days, treatment may be unilaterally withdrawn.
The family may request a court-ordered extension, which a judge
should grant only if there is a reasonable chance of finding a willing
provider. Finally, the treatment team is immune from civil or criminal
prosecution.
My objections to the Texas law center around its approach to due
process. 23 The TADA seeks to incorporate a due process standard by
insisting that all allegations of futility go forward only after they have
been reviewed and approved by the hospital ethics committee or a
medical review committee. In such situations, the ethics committee is
acting, under Texas law, as a surrogate judge and jury, with the
statutory power to authorize clinicians to take life or death actions
against the wishes of a patient or family. But whereas the judicial
system assures Americans of access to a "jury of peers" or at least an
impartial judge, hospital ethics committees are not held to this
standard. Although it is true that most committees include one or two
members of the community (often grateful patients of the hospital),
most members are physicians, nurses, and other clinicians from the
hospital staff. Without in any way calling into question their
motivations or intentions, one must recognize that they are
unavoidably "insiders," completely acculturated to the clinical world
and its attendant values. This is hardly an impartial tribunal for many,
indeed probably most, of the patients who are subject to these
decisions. The TADA thus relies on a due process approach that is
more illusory than real and that risks becoming a rubber-stamp
mechanism for systematically overriding families' requests that seem
unreasonable to the clinicians involved. During a two-year period at
Baylor, for example, the ethics committee agreed with the clinical
team in forty-three out of forty-seven cases.
24
23. Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2007).
24. Robert L. Fine & Thomas W. Mayo, Resolution of Futility by Due Process: Early Experience
with the Texas Advance Directives Act, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 743, 745 (2003).
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Furthermore, while we proudly look to our courts as the guarantors
of due process, under the Texas law judges have no latitude to
overrule or even amend the decisions of the physicians and the
hospital ethics committees. Judges are only empowered to extend the
ten-day waiting period, and even then only if there is a reasonable
chance of finding a willing provider, which is usually very unlikely.
Although it would be interesting and helpful to know the number of
times that the policy has been invoked and to be able to review the
specifics of the cases, the Texas law inexplicably includes no
provisions for such data collection or review (compare this, for
example, with the physician-assisted suicide law in Oregon, which
requires meticulous tracking of all cases). Indeed, Thaddeus Pope, a
legal scholar who has been otherwise supportive of the Texas law as
a model for other states, nevertheless commented in his recent
testimony before the President's Council on Bioethics that "it's
extremely unlikely the Texas statute will last another six months....
It doesn't comport with the requirements of Constitutional procedural
due process." He went on to say that "[a] process-based approach
may be the way to go, but we have to attend to procedural fairness.
They've been around for thirty years, but health care ethics
committees are not ready. They don't have the competence[;] they
don't have the neutrality to exercise the sort of decision-making
authority that the Texas statute has given them." 25
A historical analogy is useful here. In the 1970s, the parents of
Karen Ann Quinlan, a young woman in a persistent vegetative state,
argued that mechanical ventilation was futile and should be
discontinued. Her physicians disagreed, arguing that it would not be
ethical to discontinue a life-sustaining treatment. Had this case gone
to an ethics committee, one could easily imagine that the committee
would have sided with the clinicians. But her parents had access to
the courts, and in what is now regarded as a landmark case, the court
25. Pope, supra note 17.
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decided in favor of the rights of families to refuse unwanted medical
treatments.26
Are there ways that the Texas law could be improved? One
possibility would be to "level the playing field" by giving this
powerful authority over life-and-death decision making to another
committee without the conflicts of interest that are inherent to
hospital ethics committees. In Boston, for example, the Harvard
teaching hospitals have supported the creation of a community ethics
committee, composed of individuals from diverse backgrounds who
do not have financial or social ties to the hospitals. This group has
already produced white papers on several controversial policy issues,
but it is not currently empowered to comment on individual clinical
cases. If thoughtfully structured and utilized, however, community
ethics committees could be educated around key aspects of medical
care at the end of life and could provide a forum for deliberation
about such cases that would be much freer from the biases and
conflicts of interest that, in my mind, plague the Texas approach.
On the other hand, the availability of a fair and neutral decisional
process is precisely what our judicial system has been designed to
provide, and it has the benefit of more than two hundred years of
development and refinement. We should consider carefully whether
the creation of a "shadow" judicial system through the use of
community ethics committees is likely to offer substantial
improvements over the mechanisms already in place.
In sum, therefore, although I support a fair process approach to
futility determinations and agree that under some circumstances it is
ethical to unilaterally withdraw life support from patients against the
wishes of their families, I believe the Texas approach is seriously
flawed, and I believe any fair system must have some recourse to the
traditional protections of the courts.
26. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A
Review of the Jurisprudence of Death andDying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHics 182, 182-96 (2001).
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